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REFORMING THE REMEDY: GETTING THE 
RIGHT REMEDIAL STRUCTURE TO 
PROTECT PERSONAL PRIVACY  
NICHOLAS PETRIE∗ 
Politicians, journalists and academics have exhausted many hours over the 
last decade debating the question of whether Australia should have a 
statutory cause of action for invasion of personal privacy. In the midst of this 
ongoing debate, a simple question has often been overlooked: what remedies 
should be available to a person whose privacy been breached? In posing and 
answering that question, it is argued that a wide range of remedies for 
intrusions of personal privacy should be available to the courts. Perhaps most 
controversially, the author asserts that exemplary damages, which aim to 
punish defendants and deter future breaches of the law, should be available 
for the most heinous breaches of personal privacy. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written on the need or otherwise to introduce a statutory cause 
of action for invasion of personal privacy in Australia.1 Less attention has 
been given to the appropriate remedies that should accompany such a cause of 
                                                 
∗ BA/LLB(Hons) (University of Melbourne), Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria. 
1 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 
225–6 (Gleeson CJ), 248–58 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); 277 (Kirby J), 320–30 (Callinan J) 
(‘Lenah Game Meats’); Megan Richardson, ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of 
Privacy for Australia?’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 381; Peter Bartlett, 
‘Privacy Down Under’ (2010) 3 Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law 145; 
Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report No 108 (2008) vol 3, 2535; Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
Surveillance in Public Places, Final Report No 18 (2010) 128; New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009). 
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action.2 This article seeks to redress that omission, by examining various 
remedies which could be granted if a statutory cause of action were enacted to 
protect personal privacy. The article begins by analysing the de facto personal 
privacy protection that exists under the confidentiality doctrine in order to 
explore privacy protection as it currently stands in Australia. It is argued that 
the enactment of a statutory cause of action for invasions of personal privacy 
would not only clarify the area of personal privacy law in Australia, but also 
improve the remedial framework available for breaches of personal privacy, 
which is currently unsettled and, more importantly, unsatisfactory. After 
assessing various remedial options for breaches of personal privacy, this 
article contends that if the legislature introduces a statutory cause of action for 
the invasion of personal privacy, there should be a broad range of remedies 
available, including punitive monetary awards, known as exemplary damages. 
Finally, it is argued that providing the courts with a flexible remedial 
framework will ensure that any reform of personal privacy law will cater to 
the ever-changing technological landscape that continually gives rise to novel 
privacy challenges.  
II CURRENT PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PRIVACY IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Determining the availability and strength of privacy protection is made 
difficult by the fact that privacy is an inherently hard concept to define.3 
Leading American tort scholar William Prosser wrote in 1960 that the law of 
privacy and the torts which protected privacy could be broken into four 
categories: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
                                                 
2 See, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 1, 26 and 162. Of 44 submissions (at 26), 
the Commission ‘received only one submission about the remedies that should be available 
when there has been a serious invasion of privacy’: at 162. Cf Normann Witzleb, ‘Monetary 
Remedies for Breach of Confidence in Privacy Cases’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 430; Michael 
Tilbury, ‘Remedies for Breach of Confidence in Privacy Contexts’ (2010) 15 Media and Arts 
Law Review 290. 
3 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225–6 (Gleeson CJ). 
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4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.4 
Nearly all US states recognise some or all of these privacy rights, either at 
common law or under statute.5 In Australia, personal privacy of this kind is 
not a statutory right,6 has no explicit constitutional protection and no appellate 
court has held it to exist as a stand-alone right.7 However, aspects of personal 
privacy are protected by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), some state legislation8 
and the equitable confidentiality doctrine. 
A Privacy Protection through the Confidentiality 
Doctrine 
Victoria Park and Recreation Grounds Co Limited v Taylor (‘Victoria Park v 
Taylor’)9 was considered for many years to block the recognition of a 
common law right to privacy in Australia.10 The defendant in the case had 
broadcast radio reports of horse races taking place on the plaintiff’s premises, 
without the permission of the plaintiff.11 The plaintiff had sought an 
injunction to restrain the broadcasts, claiming that the defendant’s conduct 
amounted to a nuisance.12 In rejecting the notion that privacy could be 
protected under the head of nuisance Latham CJ remarked that the authorities 
cited failed to show that ‘any general right of privacy exists’ in Australia.13 
However, in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats 
                                                 
4 William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389.  
5 W Page Keeton et al (eds), Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (West Publishing, 5th ed, 
1984) 851. 
6 Bartlett, above n 1, 163. 
7 Ibid 151. 
8 See, eg, Privacy and Personal Information Act 1998 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2000 
(Vic); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); 
Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). 
9 (1937) 58 CLR 479. 
10 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 277 (Kirby J); Bartlett, above n 1, 147; Cf Church 
of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 68 (Murphy J) where it was stated that if 
an officer of ASIO disseminated personal information in a manner ultra vires to their office, a 
claimant may be entitled to a remedy under the ‘developing’ tort of ‘unjustified invasion of 
privacy’.  
11 Victoria Park v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 480–1. 
12 Ibid 481–2. 
13 Ibid 496.  
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(‘Lenah Game Meats’), the High Court of Australia rejected the premise that 
Victoria Park v Taylor stood in the path of an enforceable right of privacy.14  
In Lenah Game Meats, the High Court upheld a trial decision refusing to grant 
an injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing footage of possums 
being processed in an abattoir, footage which had been illegally obtained by 
an unknown trespasser and later supplied to a national broadcaster. In refusing 
the application Gummow and Hayne JJ held that a tort of privacy, if one 
existed, would benefit natural persons, not artificial persons such as the 
plaintiff.15 Therefore, their Honours stated that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether or not a tort protecting privacy should be recognised on the 
facts before the court.16 Gleeson CJ openly invited the development of the 
general law protection of privacy stating, ‘the law should be more astute than 
in the past to identify and protect interests of a kind which fall within the 
concept of privacy’.17 Thus, the High Court opened the door to further privacy 
protection in Australia, but did not clarify what form this should take. No 
appellate court since Lenah Game Meats has held that a common law right to 
privacy exists. Instead, privacy has been given de facto protection through the 
breach of confidence doctrine.18 
Breach of confidence was described by Megarry J in Coco v A N Clark 
Engineers Limited to require information: 
1. that has the necessary quality of confidence; 
2. that has been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of 
confidence; and  
3. that has been subject to an unauthorised use, to the detriment of the party 
communicating it.19  
The current operation of the confidentiality doctrine is said to afford privacy 
protection because, in order to establish the relationship of confidence in the 
second limb of the test, a plaintiff need only prove that a defendant obtained 
information in circumstances under which the defendant knew, or ought to 
                                                 
14 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 248 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 321–2 (Callinan J). 
See, for a more qualified view, 277 (Kirby J). 
15 Ibid 258. See also, 279 (Kirby J).   
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 225. 
18 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 112–3 (Neave JA). 
19 [1969] RPC 41, 47. 
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have known, from the manner in which the information was obtained, that the 
information was private.20 This negates the need for a pre-existing 
relationship to exist for a person to prove an actual or apprehended breach of 
confidence.  
Decisions since Lenah Game Meats show that a wide variety of information 
will meet the threshold ‘quality of confidence’ requirement in the first limb of 
the test from Coco v A N Clark Engineers Limited. This includes information 
about sexual relations and health records.21 A few limited defences to breach 
of confidence exist; namely that the information is already in the public 
domain or that it exposes an ‘iniquity’.22  
The protection of personal privacy provided under the confidentiality doctrine 
is incomplete in that the doctrine does not cover some situations that a 
separate tort of privacy would.23 Consider the situation where a landlord, 
standing outside the leased property, uses a peephole covered by a two-way 
mirror to secretly watch a tenant in the bathroom.24 In this scenario, breach of 
confidence would, at best, import an obligation on the landlord not to 
communicate or disclose any confidential information obtained in the course 
of the viewing. If the landlord had videotaped or recorded conversation 
through the peephole the tenant may have recourse under state legislation that 
regulates use of surveillance devices.25 However, in the absence of a 
recording or disclosure, the tenant has no recourse against an action based 
purely on the invasion of privacy. The existence of gaps in the law, such as in 
this peephole example, is one reason — along with making the law more 
holistic in the area of personal privacy — why various commentators have 
                                                 
20 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225 (Gleeson CJ); Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 
VR 1, 102 (Neave JA). See also Coco v A N Clark Engineers Limited [1969] RPC 41, 48 
(Megarry J); Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Limited (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 291 
(Lord Goff). 
21 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1; Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd 
(2006) 15 VR 419. 
22 Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 436–7. 
23 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 1, 145 [7.105]. 
24 This situation is similar to that in the Canadian case Lee v Jacobson (1992) 87 DLR (4th) 401 
(British Columbia Supreme Court).  
25 See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 7; Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8; 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 6. 
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suggested that a separate cause of action for privacy should be recognised by 
the judiciary or enacted by the legislature in Australia.26  
B Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia 
Despite the invitation in Lenah Game Meats for courts to develop the law of 
privacy, only two trial judgments have held that a tort of privacy exists under 
the common law of Australia. The first, in Grosse v Purvis, involved two 
parties to a sexual relationship which had come to an end.27 The plaintiff 
accused the defendant of stalking her and cited over 70 incidents of 
threatening conduct, of which 35 were found at trial to be partially or fully 
corroborated.28 The trial judge found that the plaintiff had developed a post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result of the defendant’s conduct and awarded 
$178 000 in damages, which included an award based on ‘the actionable right 
of an individual person to privacy’.29 Skoien SJ stated that he was taking a 
‘logical and desirable step’ in recognising a separate tort of privacy.30 His 
Honour was of the opinion that the essential elements of a new cause of action 
for invasion of privacy should be:  
a) a willed act by the defendant, 
b) which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff, 
c) in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities, 
d) and which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental, 
psychological or emotional harm or distress which prevents or hinders the 
plaintiff from doing an act which she is lawfully entitled to do.31 
A defence of public interest was said to be available to this tortious claim for 
invasion of privacy, but Skoien SJ held that, on the facts, it was not 
available.32 
                                                 
26 Jillian Caldwell, ‘Protecting Privacy Post Lenah: Should the Courts Establish a New Tort or 
Develop Breach of Confidence?’ (2003) 26(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
90; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 1, 145–6. 
27 [2003] Aust Tort Reports ¶81-706, 64 137 [21]–[24] (a decision of the District Court of 
Queensland). 
28 Ibid 64 174 [339]. 
29 Ibid 64 187 [442].  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid 64 187 [444]. 
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The second case was Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation33 
which involved the publication of information in radio news bulletins by the 
defendant broadcaster, identifying the plaintiff as a rape victim.34 The 
defendant and its two employees were held to be in breach of section 4(1A) of 
the Judicial Proceedings Reports Act 1958 (Vic), which prohibits 
identification of victims of sexual offences.35 In addition, Judge Hampel of 
the County Court of Victoria held that the defendants had ‘breached the 
plaintiff’s privacy by the unjustified publication of personal information.’36 
Unlike Skoien SJ in Grosse v Purvis, Judge Hampel did not list the indicia of 
the action for privacy which she held to exist, but described the wrong as ‘the 
publication of personal information, in circumstances where there was no 
public interest in publishing it, and where there was a prohibition on its 
publication’.37  
In both cases, the judges noted that Lenah Game Meats had invited the 
recognition of a tort of invasion of privacy and that the respective facts had 
proven sufficient for them to respond to that invitation.38 Despite these cases, 
it is unclear whether a tort of invasion of privacy or a similar cause of action 
would be upheld at an appellate level.39 Furthermore, any future development 
of privacy protection under common law is dependant on adequate test cases 
being litigated and is therefore likely to be slow and piecemeal.40 
C The Absence of the Misuse of Private Information 
Doctrine in Australia 
The Australian position in relation to confidentiality can be contrasted with 
developments in the United Kingdom. There the judiciary has recognised 
privacy as worthy of protection in its own right, but has stopped short of 
recognising a common law tort of privacy,41 as has occurred in New 
                                                                                                                    
32 Ibid 64 187 [447]. 
33 [2007] VCC 281.  
34 Ibid [2]. 
35 Ibid [80]–[81]. 
36 Ibid [164]. 
37 Ibid [163]. 
38 Ibid [157]; Grosse v Purvis [2003] Aust Tort Reports ¶81-706, 64 186 [435], 64 187 [442]. 
39 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225–6 (Gleeson CJ); Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 
VR 1, 112–3 (Neave JA); Kalaba v Commonwealth [2004] FCAFC 326; Bartlett, above n 1, 
172; Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 1, vol 3, 2552. 
40 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 1, 130 [7.14]. 
41 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 472 [46] (Lord Hoffmann). See also Wainwright v 
Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, 424 [35]. 
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Zealand.42 Developments in the United Kingdom have occurred in light of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which domestically enshrines the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (‘ECHR’).43 The most important aspects of the ECHR in relation to 
privacy are Article 8, which guarantees a right of respect for an individual’s 
private and family life, and Article 10, which protects freedom of expression. 
The separate cause of action now available in the United Kingdom is an 
evolution of the confidentiality doctrine and has been described as, among 
other things, a tort of misuse of private information.44 Under this cause of 
action a court must first determine whether, in the circumstances, there exists 
‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’.45 If an expectation is found to exist, the 
court must balance this against any countervailing considerations of public 
interest, which would justify the specific intrusion into another’s privacy.46 
Any attempt to institute action for misuse of private information is afflicted by 
questions of the action’s jurisprudential underpinning and the extent to which 
it is bound by the rules of equity or tort;47 nevertheless it provides a more 
clear form of privacy protection than exists in Australia via confidentiality.  
III CURRENT REMEDIAL FRAMEWORK 
The complicated jurisdictional underpinning of breach of confidence has 
given rise to considerable academic discussion regarding the availability of 
various remedies under this doctrine.48 In general, injunctions are sought 
where there is an apprehended breach of privacy. Once confidentiality has 
been breached, aggrieved persons often seek pecuniary relief; however the 
courts are limited in the types of monetary awards they can grant.  
A Injunctions 
Being an equitable remedy, injunctions are readily available in confidentiality 
cases.49 Injunctions, particularly interim injunctions, have historically been 
                                                 
42 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1, 32 (Court of Appeal). 
43 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967, 997 [111] (Sedley LJ). 
44 Campbell v MGN  Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 465 [14] (Lord Nicholls). 
45 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008) [7].  
46 Ibid [7]–[15]. 
47 See Witzleb, above n 2, 439. 
48 Mathew Broderick, ‘Equitable Compensation – Its Place in the Remedial Sphere’ (2005) 33 
Australian Business Law Review 369; Peter Devonshire, ‘Pecuniary Remedies for Breach of 
Confidence’ (2010) 21 King’s Law Journal 355; Tilbury, above n 2.  
49 Tilbury, above n 2, 294. 
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regarded as the most important remedy for a plaintiff claiming a breach, or 
threatened breach, of personal privacy.50 This is based on the premise that, 
once confidentiality has been breached — and in this respect the breach of 
confidence is different from a defamation — nothing can be done to 
compensate a plaintiff.51  
Jurisprudence in Australia, the United Kingdom and the European Union 
makes it clear that a court is unlikely to, by way of injunction, attempt to 
prevent publication or communication of material already in the public 
domain, since public availability strips information of its confidentiality.52 For 
example, in the high profile British case of Max Mosley, Eady J found that 
imposing an injunction to restrict publication of footage of Mosley engaging 
in a orgy would ‘merely be a futile gesture’53 because the footage had already 
‘entered the public domain to the extent that there [was], in practical terms, no 
longer anything which the law [could] protect’.54 However, more than limited 
or partial dissemination must occur for information to be considered in the 
public domain.55 For example, publication of information on the internet will 
not automatically mean that the information has lost its quality of 
confidence.56  
The rise of online media has meant that injunctions are often an ineffective 
remedial mechanism in the digital age.57 They can become difficult to enforce 
once obtained,58 as seen during the Ryan Giggs saga.  
                                                 
50 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 807; Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed, 2006) 137.  
51 Gavin Phillipson, ‘Max Mosley goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant Notification and 
Interim Injunctions’ (2009) 1 Journal of Media Law 73, 74; Mosley v News Group 
Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008) [230]–[231]. 
52 Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 427; Saltman 
Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 413, 415 (Greene MR); 
Observer v United Kingdom (1992) 216 Eur Court HR (Ser A) ; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v 
Netherlands (1995) 306-A Eur Court HR (Ser A).  
53 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 687 (QB) (4 April 2008) [36].   
54 Ibid. 
55 Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 431–3; Barclays 
Bank plc v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2009] EWHC 591 (QB) [22]. 
56 Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 433. 
57 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008); CTB v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1232 (16 May 2011).  
58 I C F Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, 
Recitification and Equitable Damages (Lawbook, 8th ed, 2010) 405.  
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In April 2011 the British newspaper The Sun published a story about a sexual 
relationship between an unnamed football star and a reality TV star.59 The 
player in question, Ryan Giggs, went to court and was granted an injunction 
restraining the defendants from identifying him or further publishing accounts 
of the sexual relationship.60 After assessing whether the injunction should be 
refused because the relevant material was already in the public domain,61 
Eady J emphasised that, despite some publication, some privacy can still 
remain.62 With this in mind, Eady J granted the injunction.  
Nevertheless, Giggs was identified as the unnamed footballer on the internet, 
by more than 75 000 Twitter users, among others.63 This prompted the 
newspaper to apply to have the injunction lifted.64 Eady J refused to alter the 
anonymised injunction, finding that modern privacy law in the United 
Kingdom ‘is not concerned solely with information or “secrets”: it is also 
concerned importantly with intrusion’.65 Despite the injunction not having 
named the plaintiff, John Hemming MP named Giggs under the cloak of 
parliamentary privilege.66 In refusing a further application by the defendant 
newspaper to lift the injunction, Tugendhat J noted that the court order had 
‘not protected the claimant and his family from taunting on the internet’67 but 
thought it was ‘still effective to protect them from taunting and other intrusion 
and harassment in the print media’.68 However, the mainstream English press 
began naming Giggs based on media immunity in the reporting of 
parliamentary proceedings.69 The Giggs case shows that, despite the 
imposition of court ordered injunctions, personal privacy can easily and 
rapidly be breached by an increasingly interconnected public. 
                                                 
59 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1232 (QB) (16 May 2011) [1]. 
60 Ibid. The order also afforded what has become known as a ‘super injunction’, which restrains 
publication of the existence of the injunction. 
61 Ibid [24]–[33].  
62 Ibid [28]. 
63 BBC News UK Ryan Giggs Named by MP as Injunction Footballer (23 May 2011), 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13503847>. 
64 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB) (23 May 2011). 
65 Ibid [23]. 
66 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1334 (QB) (23 May 2011) [2]. 
67 Ibid [3]. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See Gordon Rayner, Ryan Giggs Named as Premier League Footballer in Gagging Order 
Row, (23 May 2011) The Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/ 
8531175/Ryan-Giggs-named-as-Premier-League-footballer-in-gagging-order-row.html>; 
BBC News UK , Ryan Giggs Named by MP as Injunction Footballer (23 May 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13503847>. 
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While injunctions are a necessary element to any legal regime protecting 
personal privacy, in the words of Normann Witzleb, ‘the raison d’être of an 
injunction is its coercive character. Where an injunction is unenforceable, it is 
difficult to see that it has greater vindicatory effect than an award of damages, 
or even a declaration’.70  
B Compensatory Damages 
 While Australian courts have held that damages are available to compensate 
for the loss that a plaintiff has suffered through a breach of confidence,71 there 
is debate about the foundation, if any, on which such damages should be 
awarded.72 A popular line of reasoning suggests that courts may award 
damages under modern equivalents of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 
(UK) (‘Lord Cairns’ Act’),73 which give courts the power to award damages 
in lieu of, or in addition to, an injunction, for equitable breaches.74 Another 
argument is that ‘equitable damages’, based on equity’s inherent power to 
make compensatory awards, are available under the confidentiality doctrine.75  
The difficulty of articulating the correct grounding for awards of damages in 
breach of confidence matters is compounded by the fact that plaintiffs will 
generally be seeking monetary compensation for ‘mere distress’ rather than 
for pecuniary loss or actual injury caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing. 
Whether equitable compensation is available for mere distress is not settled, 
and tort law has allowed damages in the absence of actual harm only for 
certain torts such as trespass, assault and defamation.76 In Giller v Procopets, 
Neave JA looked to English case law in considering the grounds on which 
damages could be awarded for breach of confidence, stating: 
English authorities assume that ‘damages’ are recoverable for ‘mere 
distress’ not amounting to psychiatric injury, but do not explain whether the 
                                                 
70 Normann Witzleb, ‘Equity does not Act in Vain: An Analysis of Futility Arguments in 
Claims for Injunctions’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 503, 506. 
71 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 96 (Neave JA). 
72 Tilbury, above n 2, 291. 
73 See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 38; Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 68; Supreme 
Court Act 1935 (SA) s 30. 
74 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 94–6 (Neave JA).  
75 Ibid 99–100 (Neave JA). 
76 See Danuta Mendelson, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2007) 6; Witzleb, 
above n 2. 
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basis for such an award is an order for equitable compensation, damages 
under Lord Cairns’ Act, or on some other basis.77 
In the light of this unclear authority, and based on the call by Gleeson CJ in 
Lenah Game Meats to develop recognised causes of action to meet modern 
privacy situations, Neave JA found that damages should be available under 
Lord Cairns’ Act for breach of confidence occasioning distress.78 In addition, 
Neave and Ashley JJA held that equitable compensation should be available 
for breach of confidence.79 Neave JA concluded that: 
An inability to order equitable compensation to a claimant who has suffered 
distress would mean that a claimant whose confidence was breached before 
an injunction could be obtained would have no effective remedy.80 
Michael Tilbury has argued that Neave JA’s conclusion was ‘unconvincing’ 
because it relied, in part, on judicial statements from the United Kingdom that 
equitable compensation can be awarded for mere distress in cases involving 
misuse of private information. Such authority has developed in light of the 
Human Rights Act (UK) and is therefore ‘inapplicable’ in Australia.81  
C Aggravated and Exemplary Damages 
While it has been said that exemplary damages have become ‘well and truly 
part of the common law of Australia’82 they are not available in breach of 
confidence claims.83 Australian judges abide by the rule, as described by 
Heydon JA in Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd, that ‘there is no power in the 
law … to award exemplary damages for equitable wrongs’.84 This is based on 
the notion that the punitive aims of exemplary damages are improper in 
equity. Nevertheless, following the distinction made by Lord Devlin in 
Rookes v Barnard85 between ‘exemplary’ damages and ‘aggravated’ 
                                                 
77 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 99–100. 
78 Ibid 101–2. 
79 Ibid 100 (Neave JA), 33–4 (Ashley JA). 
80 Ibid 100. 
81 Tilbury, above n 2, 291–2. 
82 Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298, 322 (Mason P). 
83 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 33 (Ashley JA).  
84 Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298, 422. 
85 [1964] AC 1129. 
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damages,86 courts have awarded aggravated damages for breaches of 
confidence.87  
In Rookes v Barnard Lord Devlin distinguished compensatory damages from 
exemplary damages with punitive aims, which he held should be awarded 
only in three discrete scenarios: where oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional acts had been carried out by servants of the government; 
where the defendant had calculated that the profit made from his or her 
conduct would or might exceed any compensatory damages; and where statute 
allowed for such damages.88 On the other hand, aggravated damages were 
said to fall under the compensatory category, as they were said to compensate 
the plaintiff for harm caused which had been aggravated by the manner in 
which the defendant had acted in doing the wrong. So, while they may appear 
to punish the defendant’s behaviour, aggravated damages are actually 
considered compensatory, as they seek to redress further damage done to the 
plaintiff.89  
In explaining the manner in which aggravated and exemplary damages are 
assessed, the High Court — in the leading Australian case on point, Gray v 
Motor Accident Commission— stated that: 
In considering whether to award exemplary damages, the first, if not the 
principal, focus of the enquiry is upon the wrongdoer, not upon the party 
who was wronged. (The reaction of the party who is wronged to high-
handed or deliberate conduct may well be a reason for awarding aggravated 
damages in further compensation for the wrong done. But it is not ordinarily 
relevant to whether exemplary damages should be allowed).90 
Exemplary damages have also been distinguished from aggravated damages 
by the suggestion that they ‘apply only where the conduct of the defendant 
merits punishment, which is only considered to be so where his conduct is 
wanton, as where it discloses fraud, malice, violence, cruelty, insolence or the 
like’.91 In reality, exemplary and aggravated damages often address similar 
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conduct,92 being wrongs committed in a ‘highhanded, malicious, insulting or 
oppressive manner’.93 It is clever labelling that has enabled the judiciary to 
support the fallacy that the two have ‘separate and mutually exclusive 
meanings’.94 
While the High Court of Australia has maintained the distinction between 
exemplary and aggravated damages, it has rejected the restriction of 
exemplary damages to Lord Devlin’s three categories.95 In Uren v John 
Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (‘Uren v John Fairfax’) Windeyer J articulated two 
factors that must be met before a court can award exemplary damages.96 
Firstly, the wrong must be of a kind for which exemplary damages might be 
given.97 As breach of confidence is an equitable cause of action, judges are 
barred from awarding this remedy. On the other hand, if privacy is recognised 
in Australia under tort law, exemplary damages may be available.98 This was 
the case in Grosse v Purvis, where Skoien SJ awarded $20 000 as an 
‘exemplary sanction’ directed at the defendant’s conduct.99 
The second factor required by Windeyer J in Uren v John Fairfax to justify a 
verdict for exemplary damages was positive misconduct.100 This second factor 
is what shifted the law in Australia away from the three strict categories of 
wrongful conduct of Rookes v Barnard. Australian courts have since accepted 
that a range of misconduct can satisfy this second requirement, such as actions 
which amount to a ‘conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s 
rights’.101  
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D Account of Profits  
An alternative to damages is an award of ‘account of profits’, which has 
traditionally acted to strip an unjustly enriched party of profit wrongfully 
acquired through a breach of equitable right.102 It has been said by Lord 
Bridge that, where an injunction is futile in a breach of confidence context, 
the correct remedy would be an account of profits.103 However, information 
disclosed in breach of confidence may not have an easily quantifiable value 
and any profit flowing from the breach may be difficult to determine. For 
example, how would one determine the profit made by a newspaper which 
publishes a story about a celebrity sex scandal in breach of confidence? The 
story is just one factor impacting on readership and advertising revenue for 
that day or week. Furthermore, as in the Giggs example, widespread breach of 
confidence over the internet may not lead to any party making a discernible 
profit.  
Also, in bringing an action for breach of confidence a plaintiff must elect 
either damages or an account of profits – the two act as alternative 
remedies.104 The lack of certainty in assessing profit and the increasing 
acceptance of damages as a legitimate remedy makes it more likely that 
claimants will elect to pursue damages rather than an account of profits in 
confidentiality matters. 
IV CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR LAW REFORM 
Privacy has become a buzz topic in Australian law reform circles in recent 
years, particularly since the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) 
released a comprehensive report into privacy in August 2008.105 One of the 
recommendations of the ALRC was that the federal government enact a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasions of the privacy of natural 
persons, where the action of the respondent has been reckless or intentional.106 
Under the legislation suggested by the ALRC a claimant would have to show 
that, in the circumstances, there was a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
that the act or conduct complained of was highly offensive to a reasonable 
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person of ordinary sensibilities.107 While ‘serious invasion’ was not defined, 
the ALRC suggested a list of examples of possible invasions of privacy: 
serious interference with home or family life; unauthorised surveillance; 
interference with and misuse or disclosure of private correspondence; and 
disclosure of sensitive facts relating to an individual’s private life.108 In 
determining whether an individual’s privacy has been invaded under the 
proposed cause of action, a court would have to determine whether the 
claimant’s privacy outweighs other matters of public interest, including the 
public’s right to be informed about matters of public concern and freedom of 
expression.109 
In 2009 the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) also 
recommended a cause of action to protect against invasions of privacy.110 The 
NSWLRC suggested a general cause of action that sought to protect against 
invasions of information privacy and intrusions on seclusion.111 After 
stressing its broad support for a statutory cause of action,112 the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (‘VLRC’), in 2010, recommended that two causes of 
action be enacted – one for misuse of private information and another for 
intrusion upon seclusion.113 Then, in September 2011, the federal government 
released an Issues Paper seeking public views as to whether the federal 
parliament should create a right for individuals to seek redress from another 
person who seriously invades their privacy.114  
Enacting a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy could fill 
some of the gaps in privacy protection that exist in Australia,115 as 
exemplified by the peephole scenario discussed above. Any new legislation 
will be able to cherry-pick the most appropriate remedies to ensure the 
effectiveness of the new cause of action, while simultaneously freeing the 
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courts from the need to justify orders by reference to, among other things, the 
historical split between law and equity.116  
V REMEDIAL POSSIBILITIES 
Remedies available for breach of confidence are often an inadequate or 
unsatisfactory means of making good intrusions into personal privacy. 
Michael Tilbury has stated that ‘if privacy and confidentiality are simply 
different concepts … it is difficult to believe that a uniform pattern of 
remedies is possible in respect of both.’117 Therefore, a remedial regime 
provided for a right to privacy should not be constrained by the jurisprudential 
underpinnings or historical understandings of confidentiality.  
In recommending a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, 
the 2008 ALRC report suggested that a ‘court should be empowered to choose 
the remedy that is most appropriate in the circumstances, free from the 
jurisdictional constraints that may apply to that remedy in the general law’.118 
The report went on to state that courts should be empowered to grant one or 
more of the following remedies: 
1. damages, including aggravated damages, but not exemplary damages; 
2. an account of profits; 
3. an injunction;  
4. an order requiring the respondent to apologise to the claimant; 
5. a correction order; 
6. an order for the delivery up and destruction of material; and  
7. a declaration.  
The following section examines the remedies, including some in this list 
above, that could be employed in personal privacy matters. It contends that 
any statutory cause of action in Australia should be matched by a flexible 
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remedial structure, because any right protected by law requires an adequate 
remedial arsenal. In the words of Gaudron and McHugh JJ: 
If the courts of common law do not uphold the rights of individuals by 
granting effective remedies, they invite anarchy, for nothing breeds social 
disorder as quickly as the sense of injustice which is apt to be generated by 
the unlawful invasion of a person's rights.119 
Injunctions are not examined in the following section, as this remedy is well 
accepted as important to privacy cases and faces limited attacks on its 
legitimacy or the extent to which it should be awarded.120 One the other hand, 
particular attention is given to exemplary damages, as this remedy has faced 
sustained criticism in privacy reform publications. 
A Compensatory and Aggravated Damages 
There is wide support for compensatory damages being available, even for 
mere distress, under any new statutory cause of action for privacy.121 This is 
because the difficulty in assessing damage done to feelings by a breach of 
personal privacy is outweighed by the understanding that any action for 
personal privacy not empowering courts to award damages would only 
provide hollow protection for aggrieved parties.122 If compensatory damages 
were available under a new cause of action, judges would be freed from 
assessing antiquated arguments on the availability of compensatory damages 
for personal privacy claims.123  
The ALRC explicitly supported the availability of aggravated damages for 
breaches of personal privacy claims.124 In its initial consultation paper, the 
NSWLRC also suggested that aggravated damages should be available under 
its proposed statutory cause of action.125 However, its final report stated that a 
statutory cause of action would not need to explicitly afford claimants the 
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right to aggravated damages, as the compensatory damages regime under it's 
suggested cause of action would aim to compensate injury to feelings or 
mental distress, which would include consideration of any aggravating 
conduct of the defendant.126 Therefore, aggravated damages were also 
supported in the NSWLRC report, but the need to label them 'aggravated' was 
not.127   
As privacy cases are likely to be brought for injury to feelings or other non-
economic loss, which is inherently hard to assess, there is a legitimate fear 
that such awards could be inconsistent or excessive. It is for this reason that a 
statutory cause of action should cap the amount of damages available to 
plaintiff. The NSWLRC recommended that damages for non-economic loss 
flowing from privacy breaches should be capped at $150 000 plus indexing.128 
Considering that defamation, like privacy, seeks to compensate the injured 
feelings of the plaintiff through damages,129 it would seem wise to cap the 
amount available under the two causes of action in equal amounts. The cap for 
damages arising from non-economic loss under the defamation statutes passed 
in Australian jurisdictions and known collectively as the ‘uniform defamation 
laws’ was $324 000 at 1 July 2011.130 Equally capping damages under the two 
causes of action would also prevent claimants cynically choosing the action 
which has a potentially higher award, where the facts could give rise to a 
claim in both defamation and privacy. 
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B Exemplary Damages  
Despite their long history in civil cases,131 exemplary damages are commonly 
categorised as inapposite and heretical to private law.132 Chief among the 
concerns about these awards is that they import criminal functions into the 
civil law.133 Yet the High Court has accepted exemplary damages as a 
legitimate element of private law in Australia.134 To be sure, there are 
jurisdictional issues surrounding awards of exemplary damages in both equity 
and in tort law.135 However, these considerations should not cloud any 
decision as to whether they should be afforded as a remedy in any new 
statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy. This decision should look to 
the merits of exemplary damages, free from any jurisdictional hangover that 
has seen these damages labelled as inappropriate.  
Limiting exemplary damages to strict circumstances, such as those set out in 
Rookes v Barnard, has been widely criticised136 and not accepted in 
Australia.137 There has also been some support for the availability of 
exemplary damages for certain invasions of privacy.138 However, in 
recommending that a cause of action for privacy be enacted, the ALRC, 
NSWLRC and VLRC all argued against such a remedy for the causes of 
action proposed.139 Each report assumed that exemplary damages should not 
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be available for breaches of privacy based on the argument that the civil law 
should aim only to restore the plaintiff to the position in which he or she 
would have been had the wrong not been committed.140 The VLRC also stated 
that ‘exemplary damages also raise unresolved concerns, such as whether the 
criminal law, with its safeguards for defendants, might be the more 
appropriate forum for punishing a wrongdoer and whether their award may 
amount to a windfall for the plaintiff.’141 
Australian jurisprudence has increasingly accepted that elements of 
punishment and deterrence have a historical role, as well as a current role, in 
civil law.142 The High Court has gone as far as questioning the ‘sharp 
cleavage’ between civil and criminal law that is said to underpin the inability 
to award exemplary damages in private law.143 Furthermore, courts have 
accepted that exemplary damages have various legitimate aims. In Lamb v 
Cotongo the High Court noted that exemplary damages may be awarded to 
deter, not only the behaviour of the defendant, but also that of ‘other like-
minded persons’ and may apply ‘generally to conduct of the same 
reprehensible kind.’144 The High Court also held that exemplary damages 
could be legitimately deployed by the court to condemn the action of the 
defendant, to mitigate any urge for revenge felt by victims and to discourage 
‘any temptation to engage in self-help likely to endanger the peace.’145 
Finally, the High Court held that damages with punitive aims, even if they 
could be described as a windfall for the plaintiff, have an ‘element of 
appeasement, if not compensation’.146 Despite acceptance of exemplary 
damages as a legitimate part of Australian law, they are awarded in only the 
rarest circumstances.147 The High Court in Gray v Motor Accident 
Commission was at pains to emphasise this rarity, stating that exemplary 
damages ‘recognise and punish fault, but not every finding of fault warrants 
their award. Something more must be found’.148  
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The European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that large monetary 
orders in privacy matters can have a deterrent impact.149 In Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers Limited,150 the defendant was ordered to pay £60 000 in 
damages,151 along with a costs order of approximately £420 000, in addition 
to his own legal fees.152 The European Court of Human Rights noted that the 
order, although not labelled exemplary or punitive, could ‘reasonably be 
expected to have a salutary effect on journalistic practices’.153 
One situation where exemplary damages should be awarded is where 
publication of private material has occurred in a manner which indicates that 
the publisher has chosen to inflame or heighten the invasion of privacy. Here, 
a court would assess whether the way in which the privacy has been breached, 
or the medium chosen to publish private information, has increased the impact 
that the breach of privacy has had on the plaintiff. There is already judicial 
support in the United Kingdom and Europe for a multi-layered understanding 
of privacy, whereby the facts constituting the intrusion of privacy are 
considered to establish not only the breach but also the quantum of 
damages.154 For example, in Mosley v United Kingdom, the court held that the 
publication of videos and photographs of the plaintiff’s sexual engagement 
with prostitutes, on top of a textual account of the matter, was a deep intrusion 
into the plaintiff’s privacy which only served to ‘titillate and entertain’.155 An 
award of damages could include an expressly punitive element directed at 
media outlets which choose to go above and beyond what is required to tell a 
story adequately and where that choice has seriously increased the invasion of 
privacy. The media would be free to take the risk of breaching a person’s 
privacy in telling a story, but would do so knowing they would be particularly 
punished if they did so in a way which unnecessarily humiliated or disgraced 
the person. 
The express availability of deterrence as an aim of redress in breaches of 
personal privacy could also prove important in situations involving new media 
and technologies. For example, a person such as Giggs, who has successfully 
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gained an injunction for an apprehended breach of personal privacy, may later 
bring an action against a person who breaches both their privacy and the 
injunction by posting on a social media website such as Twitter.156 In this 
case, an element of exemplary damages, proportionate to the circumstances 
and appropriate to the party who has breached the privacy, should be 
considered, especially if the offending party obtained and published the 
information in the knowledge of the injunction and in flagrant disregard of the 
rights of the plaintiff. The courts would be able to send a message to internet 
users that privacy and court ordered injunctions should not be lightly and 
flagrantly breached.   
Other jurisdictions have acknowledged the role that punitive awards can play 
in redressing breaches of personal privacy. In Herrity v Associated 
Newspapers [Ireland] Ltd,157 the plaintiff sued a newspaper for publishing 
private information about a sexual relationship between the plaintiff and a 
priest. In addition to €60 000 in compensatory and aggravated damages, the 
High Court of Ireland awarded the plaintiff €30 000 in punitive damages, for 
the ‘flagrant and unwarranted breach’ of the plaintiff’s privacy.  
Courts in Canada have awarded punitive damages for breaches of statutory 
causes of action for privacy, which have been enacted in British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and the civil law 
province of Quebec.158 In 2008, Truscott J of the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia upheld an award $35 000 in punitive damages for an invasion of 
privacy, where the plaintiff, who had been in a sexual relationship with the 
defendant, was secretly filmed while in the defendant’s bathroom.159 The 
plaintiff and her child had been filmed via a peephole set up by the defendant 
in the bathroom cabinet, where the filming had been assisted by the specific 
arrangement of mirrors.160 The court accepted that, as a result of these events, 
the plaintiff had been humiliated, had struggled to enter intimate relations for 
fear of being tapped again and had been unable to work for about one year 
due to ongoing depression.161 The plaintiff had been prescribed 
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antidepressants and had also seen a counsellor.162 Truscott J explicitly stated 
that the plaintiff was seeking to punish the defendant for his action and that 
civil action was the only legal recourse open to her, due to the operation of the 
criminal law at the time of the offence.163 The award of punitive damages was 
additional to compensatory damages and a nominal amount that had been 
awarded for loss of capacity to earn income.164  
In Malcolm v Fleming,165 another Canadian case relating to secret videotaping 
of a woman in a bathroom, Downs J awarded punitive damages of $35 000, in 
part to acknowledge the ‘ongoing nature of that invasion and the possibility of 
it being disseminated to other persons’166 flowing from the fact that privacy 
had not just been invaded, but captured on video tape.  
A non-exhaustive list of considerations that a court could take into account 
when awarding exemplary damages — a list drawing on case law and existing 
statutory regimes providing for exemplary damages167 — would ensure 
consistency in the making of such awards. The list of factors that could be 
considered by the courts should include: 
1. whether the defendant acted intentionally in disregard, or consciously 
in contumelious disregard, of the rights of the plaintiff or persons in 
the position of the plaintiff; 
2. whether the conduct subject to the claim had already given rise to 
criminal punishment and, if so, the extent of that punishment;  
3. the extent to which the conduct subject to the claim was 
inconspicuous, secretive or hidden; 
4. the extent, thoroughness and duration of the privacy breach; 
5. the need to deter similar breaches of personal privacy; 
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6. the conduct of the defendant during the act and after the invasion of 
personal privacy, or after the plaintiff realised that his or her privacy 
had been breached; 
7. any benefit which the defendant gained through the breach of 
personal privacy; and 
8. any other relevant matters.  
The media and other stakeholders fear that enacting a statutory cause of action 
may lead to the chilling of freedom of speech.168 This fear would be 
compounded if exemplary damages were made available. However, other 
jurisdictions that have causes of action for privacy, be they statutory or at 
common law, have not seen a flurry of cases in privacy before the courts. 
Instead, journalists and the general public learn what is acceptable and what is 
not, which then moulds their behaviour.169 The availability of exemplary 
damages can play an important part in this moulding process, enabling the 
court to condemn the most egregious breaches of personal privacy. 
Furthermore, as discussed, the experience in Canada in relation to privacy 
cases and Australia in other areas of the law, is that courts are wise enough to 
award exemplary damages with restraint.170  
Another argument raised against the availability of exemplary damages in 
cases of personal privacy is that legislative reform in other areas has 
deliberately restricted the award of these damages.171 For example, Australian 
uniform defamation laws bar exemplary damages,172 overturning the common 
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law acceptance of the remedy.173 Despite this trend, some statutes provide for 
exemplary damages.174  
It is right to question why a defamed plaintiff should not be afforded a right to 
exemplary damages but a plaintiff whose privacy has been breached should. 
With regard to defamation, a compensatory monetary award and official 
recognition of the wrong may be enough to ameliorate the harm done to the 
defamed person, as a successful defamation case may vindicate the plaintiff, 
uphold their reputation and compensate them for the emotional hurt suffered 
via the defamatory imputations.175 However, as is often said, lost privacy 
cannot so easily be corrected or compensated. With compensation for hurt to 
feelings being harder to achieve in privacy cases, there is a corresponding 
need to deter actions leading to a breach of this right, or at least to deter 
breaches undertaken in offensive disregard of this right.  
There are also practical steps that could be taken to safeguard against 
unintended use of the remedy by the courts and to allay the fears of the media. 
In addition to capping the total amount of damages for non-economic loss, the 
availability of exemplary damages could also be balanced by the operation of 
‘defences’ to the award of this remedy. For example, in Fontin v Katapodis 
the High Court accepted that provocation may operate to vitiate or reduce an 
amount awarded as exemplary damages.176  
Obviously exemplary damages will not deter all future invasions of personal 
privacy. However, the availability and sparing use of exemplary damages will 
strike the balance between deterrence from brutal invasions of privacy and 
personal liberty from heavy-handed civil remedies.177  
C Account of Profits  
There are likely to be difficulties in awarding an account of profits in privacy 
claims, as there are with breaches of confidence. Firstly, many privacy 
breaches, such as in the peephole example, will not give rise to any profit in 
the hands of the defendant. Secondly, where privacy has been breached and a 
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profit has been made — for example where a newspaper publishes 
information in breach of privacy and the story is successful with readers — it 
is difficult to determine the amount of profit that the privacy breach has 
directly caused. However, as was noted by the ALRC and NSWLRC, 
difficulty in determining the profit should not be a reason for that remedy’s 
non-existence.178 Therefore, despite being a remedy that may only be awarded 
in exceptional circumstances, an account of profits should nevertheless be 
available to the courts.  
D Non-exhaustive List of Remedies 
Unlike the ALRC report, the NSWLRC report included a catch-all remedy 
enabling the courts to order ‘other remedies or orders that the court thinks 
appropriate in the circumstances’.179 The NSWLRC argued that having more 
flexible remedies ‘enables the court to draw on analogous common law and 
statutory law to fashion relief that is appropriate to the circumstances of the 
particular case’.180 The report went on to suggest that remedies under a 
general clause such as this could include asset preservation orders and search 
orders.181  
A non-exhaustive list of remedies would allow the courts to impose remedies 
for situations not yet conceived of by the legislative drafters. With the rise of 
social media, breaching privacy has become much easier, faster and 
potentially more damaging.182 It is increasingly possible for ordinary people, 
who, unlike the mainstream media, do not have large sums of money to pay 
damages and costs orders, to cause wide-scale privacy breaches. For this 
reason, remedial creativity may be beneficial in the future.  
In 2011 it was reported that Fahmi Fadzil came to an agreement with a 
Malaysian magazine to ‘tweet’ 100 apologies after he posted allegedly 
defamatory remarks on his Twitter account about the Human Resources 
department of that magazine.183 It should be left open to the courts in privacy 
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cases to impose orders for such apologies, corrections and other action online. 
Giving the courts the flexibility to deal in the best way possible with types of 
privacy breaches which we cannot contemplate now will ensure that any legal 
reform in the area of personal privacy will stand the test of time. However, in 
order to ensure that remedies are not haphazardly awarded at the whim of the 
court, legislation should mandate that any remedy which is not explicitly 
provided for by the legislation can be awarded only where all other remedies 
are unavailable or inappropriate – with the plaintiff bearing the onus of 
establishing this. 
E Pre-notification Requirements  
Another remedy that has been suggested in privacy matters is a pre-
notification requirement. After being awarded £60 000 plus costs, Max 
Mosley appealed his case to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing 
that ECHR article 8 requires a publisher to pre-notify the subject of a 
publication which is about to disclose material related to his or her private 
life.184 The application centred on the notion that the availability of injunctive 
relief is futile where the potential breach of personal privacy has been kept 
secret from an aggrieved person. After assessing various privacy laws and 
protections under the law in the United Kingdom, the European Court 
dismissed Mosley’s claim on grounds which included the findings that: 
a) A pre-notification requirement would need a ‘public interest’ 
exception, affording a publisher the choice not to pre-notify a 
potential claimant. This exception could not be defined too narrowly, 
or it would fall foul of ECHR art 10. Therefore, it is not unlikely that 
News of the World would have chosen not to notify Mosley of the 
pending publication. 
b) Only the threat of a punitively high fine would be likely to deter 
newspapers from publishing private material without pre-notification; 
and, even then, a publisher could run the risk of publication in the 
knowledge that a fine would be incurred after the fact.185  
The pre-notification suggestion by Mosley is flawed on policy grounds in that 
it would require the media to consistently inform people of the chance that 
their privacy would be breached. This would fundamentally increase the time 
and cost of journalism. Furthermore, whilst exemplary damages would be 
                                                 
184 Mosley v United Kingdom [2011] Eur Court HR 774. 
185 Ibid [125]–[128]. 
2012 REFORMING THE REMEDY 149 
awarded only in the rarest cases of outrageous conduct, it would be incumbent 
on a court to punish a party which had not complied with the requirement for 
pre-notification, even if the initial breach of privacy was not particularly 
intrusive. Finally, the imposition of a pre-notification requirement would be 
unworkable in the modern world, where publication of private facts is 
increasingly likely to be undertaken by the public rather than the mainstream 
media. It is impossible to expect that the public, such as bloggers and Twitter 
users, would comply with pre-notification requirements. Thus, the media 
would be disadvantaged in their pursuit of breaking news when compared 
with citizen journalists.  
VI CONCLUSION 
American jurist Charles Fried once wrote that ‘privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control 
we have over information about ourselves’.186 However, as Fried went on to 
say, one must acknowledge the ‘inevitable fact that privacy is gravely 
compromised in any concrete social system’ due to the ‘utterly just exercise of 
rights by others’.187 While we may have to accept that our privacy will be 
compromised in a modern society, if we choose to legislate to curb the 
increased intrusion into our private lives, we need to make available to the 
courts the most appropriate remedial options. This includes allowing the 
courts to actively deter particularly heinous actions in disregard of the right to 
privacy. Rapid advances in technology mean that we cannot predict the ways 
in which our privacy will be challenged in the years to come. This adds 
further weight to the argument that the judiciary should be afforded a flexible 
and practical array of remedies to make good intrusions into personal privacy. 
Central to this notion of remedial flexibility, are exemplary damages, which 
should be available to be awarded in the rarest circumstances, to punish the 
defendant, deter his or her peers and show the court’s condemnation of 
breaches of personal privacy conducted with the utmost disregard for 
another’s rights.  
                                                 
186 Charles Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475, 482. 
187 Ibid 487. 
